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Abstract
Trust establishment over vehicular networks can enhance the security against
probable insider attackers. Regrettably, existing solutions assume that the at-
tackers have always a dishonest behavior that remains stable over time. This
assumption may be misleading, as the attacker can behave intelligently to avoid
being detected. In this paper we propose a novel solution that combines trust es-
tablishment and a risk estimation concerning behaviour changes. Our proposal,
called RITA, evaluates the trust among vehicles for independent time periods,
while the risk estimation computes the behavior variation between smaller, con-
secutive time periods in order to prevent risks like an intelligent attacker at-
tempting to bypass the security measures deployed. In addition, our proposal
works over a collaborative multi-hop broadcast communication technique for
both Vehicle-To-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-To-Roadside unit (V2R) messages
in order to ensure an efficient dissemination of both safety and infotainment
messages. Simulation results evidence the high efficiency of RITA at enhancing
the detection ratios by more than 7% compared to existing solutions, such as
T-CLAIDS and AECFV, even in the presence of high ratios of attackers, while
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offering short end-to-end delays and low packet loss ratios.
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Trust Management, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks, Risk estimation, Message
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1. Introduction
Securing communications in distributed and collaborative networks is always
a challenging task, and it is even becoming mandatory in most cases. Usually
it requires adopting case-specific and situation-adaptable communication proto-
cols addressing the different security issues. In wireless environments, achieving5
an adequate security level is more challenging than in wired environments due
to the open communication medium. In addition, the assumption that all peers
are honest, trustful, and collaborative is not always true.
Many efficient security solutions have been proposed to secure wireless and
collaborative communications, most of them being based on a centralized ad-10
ministration or a trusted third party. However, in mobile distributed net-
works, security remains an open and complex problem, especially in the case of
infrastructure-less networks, usually called Mobile Adhoc NETworks (MANETs),
where there is neither a centralized administration nor a stable topology.
A subcategory of MANETs that inherits all the aforementioned problems are15
Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VANETs). Having as its main aim the enhancement
of road safety, most of its applications are based on distributed and collabo-
rative communications among vehicles (vehicle-to-vehicle communication) and
between vehicles and roadside units (vehicle-to-infrastructure communication).
In this scenario, RoadSide Units (RSUs) are assumed to be the link between20
vehicles and such trusted third party, or be the trusted third party itself.
Similarly to MANETs, VANETs can use existing cryptography-based solu-
tions to overcome the different kinds of external attacks [1]. However, in addition
to the cryptography cost in terms of overhead and processing time, these solu-
tions cannot punish nor detect those attacks launched by an authorized vehicle25
2
(inside attacker). For this reason, researchers have proposed novel trust man-
agement solutions inspired by economic science to deal with such unexpected
inside attackers [2]. Unlike cryptography-based solutions, trust management
has lower computational requirements and introduces a lower overhead, while
also supporting mobility; however, it cannot detect outsider attackers. Hence,30
trust modeling can be seen as an additional security technique that fills the gap
of cryptography-based solutions. Moreover, trust is widely adopted as a replace-
ment for cryptography, especially for delay-sensitive applications like VANET
safety and real-time multimedia streaming applications.
Establishing trust in VANETs is based on the common assumption that trust35
must be hard to obtain and easy to lose, which means that network entities must
strive to increase the level of trust on themselves through their honesty and an
adequate network collaboration, while such trust can be lost through a relatively
lower number of dishonest acts [3].
In this paper we focus mainly on the problem where vehicles can become40
effective at achieving network disruption by alternating between legal behavior
patterns and malicious attacks (”anti-trust management” strategies). Figure 1
illustrates this time-varying behaviour, which is similar to the On-Off attack in
wireless sensors networks (WSN) [4] and known as betrayal attack in VANETs
[5]. While trust management is generally based on an evaluation of historical45
interactions, detecting these short-term attacks is a complex task. In addition,
the bad mouthing attack [6], which can be also seen as an anti-trust management
strategy, occurs when no precautions are taken against selfish vehicles generating
only bad reports about other vehicles.
Thus, we introduce an estimation of risk associated to behaviour changes as50
an additional process to improve trust management among vehicles, thereby at-
tempting to avoid sophisticated attacks. Our solution aims at filling-in the gap
of classical trust models when facing the aforementioned illegal behavior. Trust
and risk estimation processes rely on a timing-based technique to give more im-
portance to actions occurring in recent time instants instead of accounting for55


















Figure 1: Intelligent dishonest behavior.
ria, which are: (i) trust variability for different time intervals, i.e., the difference
between consecutive trust evaluations; (ii) safety-related behavior referring to
the reported event effectiveness, since this is a main concern for vehicular net-
works, while also representing the in-network collaboration of vehicles; and (iii)60
evaluation of recommendations’ quality, in order to avoid the bad mouthing
attack.
Moreover, we use our trust establishment architecture to propose a novel
multi-hop broadcasting technique that ensures high message delivery ratios even
in the presence of vehicles acting as blackholes [7] without causing the broadcast65
storm problem. The adversarial model addressed in this paper focuses mainly
on the betrayal, blackhole, and bad mouthing attack techniques.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present an adversary-
based classification of the existing trust models for VANETs. Then, an overview
of our proposal called RITA is provided in section 3. In section 4 we clarify the70
trust and risk computation details. Afterward, in section 5, we explain how the
trust establishment can enhance multi-hop broadcast message dissemination in
VANETs. Section 6 is dedicated to the simulation parameters and results’ dis-
cussion. Finally, section 7 provides some concluding remarks and the future
directions for our work.75
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2. Related works
Existing solutions are usually classified into entity-based [8, 9, 10], data-
based [11, 12], and hybrid trust models, depending on the revocation target,
which can be dishonest entities, malicious messages, or both of them [13, 14,
15]. In addition, most VANET applications are based on multi-hop broadcast80
vehicle-to-vehicle communication, and most of the existing trust models focus on
routing, path disruption, and resource exhausting attacks including blackholes
and bogus messages’ injection. In the following, we survey and classify the main
existing works depending on their adversary models.
2.1. Trust-based solutions against replayed, altered, and injected messages85
This kind of attacks can cause huge damage, especially in safety-related
contexts. Hence, most of the existing works fall under this category.
The entity-oriented trust models presented in [8, 9] try to revoke nodes by
sending falsified messages and fake information, respectively, using different
techniques. Haddadou et al. [8] chose to associate a credit value to each neigh-90
bor vehicle. This credit will increase or decrease depending on the concerned
neighbor’s messages trustiness. Concerning Yang’s solution [9], it uses the Eu-
clidean distance to compute the similarity between nodes in terms of reported
events. Unfortunately, the first solution does not differentiate between direct
and indirect trust, while for the second it faces a huge problem in the case of95
false recommendations.
The detection of attacks related to message quality is a process that is usually
based on messages themselves, which explains why some of the existing works
within this category are Data-oriented trust models [16, 12].
Golle et al.[16] have adapted a signature-based technique in which every100
received message is compared to a typical model of legal VANET messages.
The problem with this solution is that it is not feasible to actually build such
global model; in addition, all new legal messages will be dropped as well. Unlike
[16], Gurung et al. [12] use three main metrics to classify received messages into
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either legal or malicious messages; these metrics are content similarity, content105
conflict, and routing path similarity. However, in addition to its high time
complexity, this solution does not take into account the high level of mobility
associated to VANETs, nor the case of node sparsity.
Some Hybrid trust models have been also proposed in this same context in-
cluding [13, 17]. Zhang et al. [13] propose a semi-distributed trust framework110
for message propagation and evaluation; in their approach the clusterheads are
responsible for broadcasting and then gathering opinions about the broadcasted
messages. Afterward, they decide either to drop untrustworthy messages or re-
lay legal messages with the aggregated opinions to the next cluster in order to
continue the dissemination process. Similarly to other cluster-based techniques,115
the clusterhead election and the probability of malicious nodes becoming clus-
terheads are the main problems of this solution.
Differently from the aforementioned works, Marmol et al. [17] prefer asso-
ciating a confidence value to exchanged messages in addition to the gathered
recommendations from both RSU and nearby vehicles to build three fuzzy sets120
(no trust, +/-trust, trust). The message will be dropped if it belongs to the first
set, accepted but not forwarded for the second set’s case, and both accepted and
forwarded for the trusted messages set. The number of recommendations and
their trustworthiness remain as the pending problems of this solution.
2.2. Trust-based solutions against blackholes125
Inter-vehicular communication is the enabling process supporting ITS over
VANETs. Hence, forcing nodes to be collaborative is an indispensable task.
Solutions falling under this category try to detect selfish nodes acting as black-
holes in order to ensure a more efficient forwarding process for both safety and
data messages.130
The Entity-oriented trust model proposed by Khan et al. [18] proposes com-
puting a distrust level for every neighbor acting as a blackhole through a watch-
dog technique. This distrust level will be sent to the clusterhead, and in turn
delivered to a third trusted party that revokes the attacker certificate. Unfor-
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tunately, authors did not detail the different communication steps involved, nor135
the overhead associated to the cluster-based implementation. Whereas, in our
previous work called TROUV E [19], the idea was taking advantage of existing
CAM messages, which are periodically exchanged according to the ETSI-ITS
European standard [20], in order to estimate the distribution of the selfish nodes
within the network and, hence, select the most trusted path avoiding these140
blackholes. However, this solution only addresses unicast data traffic in urban
environments.
To deal with blackholes and the selective forwarding (greyholes) procedure,
some Hybrid trust models are also available [15, 21]. The first solution, proposed
by Sedjelmaci et al., is a two-level intrusion detection system, the first one being145
based on a collaborative in-cluster detection, and the second one on a global
detection processed by the RSU. The main weaknesses of this solution are the
excessive time associated to clusterhead election, and the assumption concerning
stable clusters around fixed RSUs.
The work of Haddadou et al. [21], called DTM2, proposes forcing nodes150
to be cooperative by establishing a communication cost. The latter is higher
for selfish nodes, decreasing alongside with in-network collaborativity. How to
choose the initial cost, and how to differentiate between selfish behavior and
packet loss due propagation issues are the mains questionable points of this
work.155
2.3. Trust-based solutions against jamming and denial of service (DoS) attacks
Similarly to blackholes, jamming and DoS attacks can also prevent important
information to be delivered on time, thereby disturbing VANET functionality.
Raya et al. [11] propose a Data-oriented trust model for Ad-hoc ephemeral
networks. This model uses different trust metrics, in addition to the a priory160
fixed entities trust (e.g. Trust(Police vehicles = 1; ordinary vehicles = 0.5)),
in order to detect whether the reported events are real, or if it is just an attempt
to jam bandwidth. They also propose evaluating the evidences related to the
reported events using Dempster-Shafer theory and Bayesian inference. The
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problems of this solution are the fixed entities trust and the required training165
phase, which cannot be ensured in practice.
In a previous work [22], we proposed to enhance the message relaying pro-
cedure to detect DoS attacks in a fast manner through the use of an intrusion
detection module. The latter takes advantage of the access categories of 802.11p
in the context of dedicated to short-range communications (DSRC) in order to170
classify the received messages at an early stage and, hence, accelerate the in-
trusion detection process. Same as all existing solutions, this approach assumes
that the adversary has a malicious behaviour that remains stable throughout
time, thus not being a valid solution under nodes acting with an intelligent
dishonest behaviour.175
2.4. Trust-based solutions against fake location and timing attack
The Data-oriented trust model proposed by Shaikh et al. [23] is an intrusion-
aware trust model that differs from other works by being capable of detecting
fake location and timing values generated either by the event’s reporter or the
message forwarder. In this event-related solution, authors propose the compu-180
tation of a confidence value for each message coming from a unique source. In
addition, for all messages describing a same event, a trust value is calculated
using the previously computed confidence information. Finally, accepting or re-
jecting an event message depends on its trust value. Despite the high accuracy
of this approach, it introduces a high waiting delay, which is not acceptable185
when targeting VANET safety applications.
2.5. Unspecified adversarial model
In addition to the aforementioned trust models, in some works authors do
not specify an adversarial model, nor the types of attack they support. Instead,
they only address trust establishment over the inter-vehicular communication190
link.
The only Entity-oriented trust model falling under this category was pro-
posed by Jesudoss et al. [24]. In particular, authors propose a clustering tech-
nique to reduce the communication overhead and assign a reputation weight to
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all nodes participating in the clusterhead election and network control tasks by195
sharing their reports about exchanged traffic. Unfortunately, this scheme does
not respect reference trust metrics such as direct and indirect trust. Moreover,
high mobility levels can cause this scheme’s performance to decrease consider-
ably.
Works in [14, 25, 26, 27] are examples of Hybrid trust approaches.200
Li et al. [25] propose a reputation-based trust establishment scheme for
VANETs where the messages and their senders are evaluated based on the direct
trust, indirect trust and node reputations. The main drawback of this scheme
is its centralized trust computing procedure through the use of an additional
infrastructure Called RMC (Reputation Management Center).205
Under the assumption that all application messages are encrypted, Chen et
al. [26] propose a beacon-based trust model for enhancing users’ location privacy
in VANETs. The proposed system can secure the VANET while maintaining
privacy by using two kinds of messages: beacons and event-based messages.
The main idea is crosschecking the plausibility of these two types of messages210
to decide if other messages are trusted or not. Despite preserving the privacy
of far-away vehicles (at more than one hop), this scheme cannot efficiently eval-
uate all kinds of messages, nor can it detect attacks occurring at upper layers
(routing, application, etc.). In addition, whenever an obstacle appears between
two neighboring vehicles, this scheme causes those two vehicles to judge each215
other as liar and malicious.
T-CLAIDS [14] is another work providing a trust-aware intrusion detection
solution for VANETs. This solution takes into account the number of vehicles,
their mobility, and their motion direction to perform an action. It also main-
tains a probability matrix of all actions which is updated in the iterations that220
follow until convergence to a particular value is achieved. This way, it offers
an approximate representation of a global knowledge about the environment.
Unfortunately, even if this solution shows good results in the general case where
malicious behaviors are stable throughout time, it looks questionable in the case
of unpredictable events or attacks. Also, the convergence time may be very long225
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in sparse cases since it will be hard to gather all the information required to
have a global view.
Last but not least, Rostamzadeh et al. [27] try to divide the map into differ-
ent areas, and the traffic into three categories: safety, infotainment, and third
party services, such as inter-transportation vehicular communication. In this230
solution, called ”FACT”, the message source should be known by piggybacking
the identities of all vehicles participating in the routing process. Meanwhile,
an admission module is responsible for analyzing the messages using the traffic
category and the piggybacked identities’ trust. If the degree of satisfaction is
high, a trusted path is selected for the message. Unfortunately, this solution235
adds a considerable overhead and processing delay. Moreover, authors do not
provide information about its security performance.
2.6. State of the art review considerations
Through this hovering upon the existing solutions in the literature, it be-
comes clear that the adversarial models adopted assumes a consistent dishonest240
behaviour throughout time. In addition, none of the existing works has studied
the case of specific attacks against trust models themselves.
In addition, the assumption of many works about creating a global knowl-
edge of the network [16, 11, 25, 14] can be effective in MANETs or similar
environments that are less dynamic than VANETs. Moreover, relying on RSU245
deployment for trust establishment [19, 15, 25] can also become a handicap since
(i) they are not always present, and (ii) the trust relationship is mostly related
to direct peer-to-peer interactions rather than peer-to-authority interactions.
Furthermore, many trust-based security solutions for VANETs [17, 8, 9, 23,
19] focus on improving the unicast and routing data exchange. However, critical250
VANET applications such as safety and service discovery are based on broadcast
and multi-hop communication instead.
In this work, we propose a trust establishment technique for collaborative
multi-hop communications called RITA. We enhance the trust computation by
relying on risk estimation to deal with ”anti-trust management” attacks. Hence,255
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our proposal can deal with both regular and intelligent attacks against classical
trust-based solutions.
3. RITA Overview
The overall architecture of our proposal, called RIsk-aware Trust-based Ar-
chitecture for collaborative multi-hop vehicular communications (RITA), is il-260
lustrated in Figure 2. RITA can be divided into different modules responsible
for: (a) computing inter-vehicular trust, (b) estimating risk, and (c) selecting
the most adequate next forwarder/broadcaster vehicles for multi-hop messages.
In addition, a database that stores the different recommendations and trust
variations is used to enhance trust and risk computation.265
The architecture of RITA takes advantage of the information carried by bea-
con, safety, and data messages to evaluate interactions among vehicles, which
can be either direct or indirect interactions. Based on these interactions among
nodes, the direct and indirect trusts are first computed and then combined to
form an inter-vehicular trust evaluation (a). Simultaneously, the risk of a prob-270
ably launched intelligent attack -i.e., periods with normal behaviour combined
with periods with dishonest behaviour- is estimated using the variation of the
local knowledge-based and recommendations-based evaluation of the messages’
sources (b). A trade-off between the inter-vehicular trust and the risk estima-
tion is then computed. This final value called ’Global trust evaluation’ can275
help in detecting both classical and intelligent attacks. Moreover, we use the
trust evaluation in next forwarder/broadcaster selection procedure (c). Hence,
the per-hop broadcasters are selected among the most trusted vehicles ensuring
short delays and high delivery ratios.
Furthermore, it is clear that, for direct interactions, all messages (even those280
initially encrypted) can be decrypted and analyzed by the end destination.
Hence, a decision about whether the interaction is legal (L) or malicious (M)
can be made using an interaction evaluation module.
Instead of updating trust values after each interaction, we propose defining
11
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Figure 2: Proposed risk-aware modular trust establishment architecture ensuring reliable
message dissemination.
small time intervals and evaluating nodes’ trust on each time interval to allow285
quickly detecting any change in the behavior pattern. Notice that adopting long
observation periods is prone to include outdated information, which has a neg-
ative impact on the trust information accuracy. Thus, we propose considering
only those interactions among vehicles taking place in the most recent period
T . In addition, we proposed to divide this period (T ) into n time slots of the290
same duration, updating the trust among vehicles for every time slot tx, where
’1 ≤ x ≤ n ’. On each new time slot we discard the oldest slot assessments -
similarly to a ’First In First Out (FIFO)’ mechanism -, thus creating a sliding
window [28]. The actual size of this window and its time slots will be based
on different experimental values that will be discussed in section 6. Hence, if a295
node behaves legally for a long time and then starts an attack, the behaviour
observed during the last slot tx weights more than the behaviour observed in
previous slots, in addition to the trust variation during these previous slots.
The global trust evaluation denoted as GT , assigned by a vehicle i to another
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vehicle j, combines both inter-vehicular trust Trust(i, j) and the risk estimation300
Risk(i, j), as defined in equation 1.
GT (i, j) = α · Trust(i, j) + (1− α) · (1−Risk(i, j)) (1)
In this equation α is a tuning factor used to adjust the trade-off between
the inter-vehicles trust computation and the risk estimation when computing
the global trust value. Notice that, since the risk estimation presents a greater
error margin compared to trust estimations, it is better to choose α ≥ 0.5305
to give more weight to the latter parameter; the global trust evaluation will
be anyway enhanced due to the introduction of the risk estimation factor. In
section 6 we assign different values to the α parameter in order to choose the
most adequate value for our experiments. However, it is worth mentioning that
this value should be adapted to the different situations and traffic scenarios to310
maximize performance. The details about how the inter-vehicular trust and risk
are computed is provided in the following section.
4. RITA details: Trust and risk estimation
In this section we provide formal details about both trust and risk estima-
tion. Section 4.1 clarifies how vehicles can compute a trust evaluation about315
each other based on both local knowledge-based and recommendation-based
information. Then, section 4.2 is dedicated to risk computation based on be-
haviour changing estimations, the honesty of broadcasted recommendations,
and the reported events validity.
4.1. Vehicle-to-vehicle trust computation320
When focusing on inter-vehicular trust we generally distinguish between two
metrics: direct trust and indirect trust. Direct trust can be defined as the
local knowledge-based evaluation of the direct interactions among vehicles, while
indirect trust is the evaluation of the direct interactions between two vehicles
based on the opinions of other vehicles about the honesty of the two participant325
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vehicles. Since direct trust is more relevant than indirect (recommendation-
based) trust when the number of interactions (#int) increases, our vehicle-to-
vehicle trust levels are adapted using the following relevance factor: 1#int+1 ; this
way, if we have more interactions, we assign more weight to direct trust than to













· IT (i, j)
]
(2)
DT (i, j) and IT (i, j) refer to the direct and indirect trust evaluation, respec-
tively, calculated by a vehicle i concerning another vehicle j. The computation
details of DT (i, j) and IT (i, j) are provided in the following sections.335
4.1.1. Direct trust computation
Before computing the direct trust evaluation, we denote by Htx(i,j) the honesty
report generated by vehicle i about vehicle j using the number of legal (L) and
malicious (M) interactions during a period of time tx, where 1 ≤ x ≤ n. Htx(i,j)
is computed following equation 3:340
Htx(i,j) =
Ltx(i,j)









where Ltx(i,j) and M
tx
(i,j) represent the number of legal and malicious interac-







represents the percentage of legal interactions compared to the total number of




is a factor that approaches 1 as the number of legal
interactions increases. Hence, many legal interactions are required for a vehicle345
to increase its honesty index.
The direct trust computation uses the different honesty values along a period
of time T by giving more importance to the last short period ’tn’. This behaviour
allows RITA to quickly detect misbehavior in neighboring vehicles. Equation 4
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Figure 3: Proposed beacon format extension.
shows how the direct trust is updated:350











Factor β, whose value ranges between 0 and 1, is a reduction factor used
to give more weight to the recent behavior of vehicles, while also taking into
account their past behavior. In addition, this process is executed only for periods
of time where there is at least one interaction between i and j; otherwise, the
value of DT (i, j) will remain unchanged.355
4.1.2. Indirect trust computation
Indirect trust is calculated based on recommendations coming from one-hop
neighbors about other vehicles. Most of the existing solutions suggest creating a
new message type called recommendation, and they choose either a cluster-based
technique or an aggregation method to reduce the additional overhead involved.360
To avoid affecting the communications bandwidth, we propose modifying the
format of the periodically exchanged beacon messages by adding only two fields:
(i) the neighbor identity, encoded in 1 byte, and (ii) the opinion of the beacon
sender about that neighbor, also encoded in 1 byte. For example: if a node i
considers that a vehicle j is untrusted, it will put the vehicle j’s identity within365
the next beacon along with an opinion which can be < 0.5 (untrusted node) or
≥ 0.5 (trusted node). This opinion correspond to the global trust evaluation
of the recommender about the recommended node GT (i, j). This procedure is
repeated until the entire neighbor list is included. Figure 3 illustrates the new
beacon format.370
Upon receiving neighbor beacons, a vehicle i computes, for every neighbor
j, an indirect trust value IT tx(i,j) in a period of time tx by combining the positive
15
and negative opinions coming from other neighbors throughout that time period.
To avoid the negative influence of dishonest vehicles’ opinions, a vehicle
i computes the trade-off between the different recommenders’ trust and their375
opinions. Hence, the higher is the level of trust on a neighbor, the more is
its opinion taken into account. Equation 5 shows how the indirect trust is












N during tx, ∀k ∈ {trusted direct neighbors of i}
(5)
In this equation N refers to the number of recommenders, IT tx(i,j) is a combi-380
nation of the recommenders’ (k) direct trust DT and their opinions about the
vehicle j during a period tx. In addition, we consider a neighbor vehicle as a
trusted vehicle if its global trust GT(i,j) is higher than a predefined threshold;
this threshold can be adapted depending on the security requirements and the
traffic type.385
Similarly to direct trust, we assign a higher weight to the latest recommenda-
tions without forgetting the overall recommendations received. This is achieved
through equation 6:











Notice that β is the same factor used in equation 4. It is clear that, if node
i does not have any direct neighbor, or if it has only malicious neighbors, the390
indirect trust (IT ) will remain unchanged.
4.2. Risk estimation
As mentioned in the related works section, trust establishment in highly dy-
namic networks suffers mainly from instant behavior changes since trust is based
on the accumulative historical interactions. Thus, it is hard to quickly detect395
changing behaviors, especially if the attackers are aware of the shortcomings
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associated to trust-aware mechanisms, and make an effort to achieve high rep-
utation values prior to launching their attack. In this context, risk estimation
can be an effective solution to solve the aforementioned problem. Our RITA
approach allows every vehicle i to estimate a risk value for a neighboring vehicle400
j by combining three different factors: (i) direct trust variability (DTV ) along
consecutive time slots in order to detect the betrayal behavior; (ii) event-related
reports (ER) represented by the ratio of fake event reports to the total number
of events reports in order to punish nodes sending reports about non-existent
events; and finally (iii) evaluations of recommendations (RC) to detect bad405
mouthing attacks, which also relies on the ratio of negative recommendations to
the total number of recommendations. Equation 7 clarifies how the risk among
vehicles is estimated:
Risk(i, j) =
DTV (i, j)2 + ER(i, j)2 + RC(i, j)2
DTV (i, j) + ER(i, j) + RC(i, j)
(7)
In this equation DTV(i,j) represents the maximum negative variation in di-
rect trust given by a vehicle i to another vehicle j along different time slots, and410
it is calculated as follows (equation 8):
DTV (i, j) =|Min(DT tx(i,j) −DT
tx+1
(i,j) ) | ∀x ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} (8)
A negative variation means that DT
tx+1





(i,j) is a negative value and, as a consequence, the maximum direct
trust variation is the absolute value of Min(DT tx(i,j) −DT
tx+1
(i,j) ) for the different
time slots tx.415
ER(i,j) is the event-related honesty, and it represents the rate of non-existent
events reported by j to the total number of events reported by that same node
in a period of time t. Since j is a direct neighbor of i, we assume that i can
verify, after a short period, if vehicle j has broadcasted a real or a fake event
report. Equation 10 shows how ER(i, j) is computed based on the different420
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periods evaluated (equation 9):
ERtx(i,j) =















Finally, RC(i,j) is the evaluation of i about the recommendations (RC) that j
has broadcasted within its beacons. If the number of negative recommendations
is excessive (e.g., more than 50% of the generated recommendations), this event
will be considered as an attempt to perform a bad mouthing attack. RC(i,j) will425
be equal to the number of negative recommendations (< 0.5) divided by the total







Card{Opinion(j, k) < 0.5}
Card{Opinion(j, k)}
∀k (11)
In addition, to improve the risk evaluation procedure, we associate to each430
parameter (DTV, ER, RC) in equation 7 a factor representing the influence of
every report compared to the two other parameters. For example, if a node
launches a betrayal attack, its DTV will be much higher than ER and RC,
and, therefore, the DTV report should have more weight than the other re-
ports. To this end, in equation 7, DTV is multiplied by DTVDTV+ER+RC , ER by435
ER
DTV+ER+RC , and RC by
RC
DTV+ER+RC .
5. Multi-hop information dissemination using RITA
Multi-hop dissemination is used mainly for alerting vehicles and authorities
on the road about a safety event. However, multi-hop dissemination is also used
for data message propagation.440
Using the global trust evaluation, any vehicle i can judge any neighbor j and,
hence, accept or reject interactions with this neighbor. As mentioned above, a
18
Safety message Next broadcaster 
1 Byte 
Figure 4: Safety message extension.
trust threshold can be chosen according to the system security requirements or
context-based information; for instance, in safety cases this threshold should be
low since it is a critical case. Thus, a decision about a vehicle ’j’ can be made445
following equation 12:
j is a trusted neighbor If GT (i, j) ≥ TrustThresholdj is an untrusted neighbor Otherwise (12)
Since most VANET applications, such as Internet access, electronic payment,
service discovery, and parking place booking, rely on Road Side Units (RSU) for
communications [29], the aim of multi-hop data message dissemination in these
intelligent transportation systems services (ITS-s) is to reach the closest RSU450
in a reduced period of time. Thus, we distinguish between two dissemination
types: (i) safety messages dissemination, and (ii) data messages dissemination,
in order to ensure a fast delivery of safety messages, and a high efficiency with
low packet loss in infotainment scenarios.
5.1. Multi-hop dissemination of safety messages455
Same as beacons, we propose to extend safety messages with an additional
field containing a pre-selected next broadcaster of the safety message, this way
we avoid broadcast storms, as well as network resource exhaustion (see figure 4).
The next broadcaster in every hop is selected in a way so that it is the farthest
trusted neighbor, thereby maximizing the additional coverage area [30, 31]. For460
every neighbor j the vehicle i associate a score Score(i, j) representing a balance
between the global trust GT (i, j) and the distance Distance(i, j) between i and
19





Equation 14 shows the selection procedure of a next broadcaster j among
the neighbors of a vehicle i:465
NextB = j / Score(i, j) = Max{Score(i, j), ∀ j ∈ Neighbors of i} (14)
Where {k, ..., N} are the current neighbor identities for vehicle i.
Once the re-broadcasting is done, vehicles receiving the same safety message
can again drop it and remove the saved version of this safety message as well.
Moreover, in the case of a broadcasting failure including both link-related and
threat-related reasons, one of the informed vehicles should take the broadcasting470
decision. In addition, the neighbors of a vehicle ’i’ are not necessarily neighbors
of each other. Hence, even if the next broadcaster selected (green car with rect-
angle in figure 5) broadcasts the safety message, we can still have some neighbors
that remain uninformed about this action. The latter should rebroadcast safety
messages to cover other non-informed zones once its waiting time has expired475
without receiving another copy of the safety message. To this end, upon receiv-
ing a safety message, every neighbor j sets a timer according to the distance to
the safety message’s source i and accounting for the communication range.
Equation 15 describes how this waiting time can be computed:
WaitingT ime = DistanceT (i, j) + TT + PT + PRT (15)
In this equation DistanceT (i, j) refers to the distance-based waiting time,480
such as in [32, 33, 34], and it is used in such a way that the farthest neighbor will
have the shortest waiting time. TT , PT , and PRT correspond to the maximum
Transmission, Propagation, and message PRocessing Times, respectively.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the safety messages’ multi-hop dissemination pro-
cedure. When vehicle i receives a safety message sent by another vehicle j, it485
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Figure 5: Per-vehicle dissemination areas.
checks the global trust GT (i, j). If it is lower than a predefined threshold, the
safety message will be dropped because j is considered to be an untrusted vehi-
cle. Otherwise, the broadcasting process should continue since ’j’ is considered
to be a trusted neighbor.
Afterward, if i finds its identity piggybacked within the safety message, this490
means that it is the one selected as next-hop broadcaster. In addition, if the
piggybacked identity is not even part of i’s neighbors list, it verifies the safety
event validity, selects the next broadcaster, and rebroadcasts the safety mes-
sage. However, if the safety event’s validity expires, the latter will be logically
canceled. Otherwise, if i is not the selected vehicle for rebroadcasting the safety495
message, and if its waiting time has expired without receiving another copy of
the safety message, it selects a new next broadcaster to broadcast the safety
message.
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Algorithm 1 Safety messages multi-hop dissemination
1: Upon receiving a safety message by i sent by j;
2: if (GT (i, j) ≥ TrustThreshold) then
3: if (’i’ is the next broadcaster OR next broadcaster /∈ neighbors list of
’i’ ) then
4: if NotExpired(safety message, relevance distance, validity duration)
then
5: NextB ← Select next broadcaster (Equation 14);
6: Broadcast(safety message, NextB);
7: else
8: Cancel (safety message);
9: end if
10: else
11: WaitingT ime ← Compute waiting time (Equation 15);
12: if Expired(WaitingTime) AND NotReceived(safety message, NextB)
then
13: NextB ← Select next broadcaster (Equation 14);







5.2. Multi-hop dissemination of data messages
Disseminating data messages among vehicles is a procedure adopted by many500
VANET applications like delivering ads, restaurant menus, and short-term offers
to passing-by vehicles. However, to have a sure and permanent broadcasting of
this information, the use of road side units is mandatory. Hence, to preserve
the communications bandwidth, vehicle-to-vehicle broadcasting is used only to
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reach the RSU.505
RITA assumes that vehicles are equipped with a Global Positioning System
(GPS), so they can locate vehicles and RSUs within the network. Similarly
to safety messages, we assume that we have an additional field containing the
selected next forwarder identity as illustrated in figure 3, but with data messages
instead of safety messages.510
Unlike the safety messages (see equation 14) where the main concern is the
delay, the next forwarder for data messages (NextF) is selected using the link du-
ration estimation and distance in addition to the trust between peers in order to
minimize both propagation delay and packet loss ratios. For every neighbor j the
vehicle i associates a score Score(i, j) representing a balance between the trust515
GT (i, j), the link duration LinkD(i, j), the distance Distance(i, j) separating
i and j, and the distance separating j from the closest RSU Distance(j, RSU)
as shown in equation 16
Score(i, j) =
GT (i, j) + LinkD(i, j) +Distance(i, j)
Distance(j, RSU)
(16)
Equation 17 represents the next forwarder selection based on the different
neighbors’ scores:520
NextF = j / Score(i, j) = Max{Score(i, j), ∀ j ∈ Neighbors of i} (17)
where {k, ..., N} is the set of neighbors for vehicle i. RSU is the closest
roadside unit in the neighborhood which can be easily found using the GPS.
The sum of the global trust given by i to j, the distance between i and j,
and the link duration between i and j, is divided by the distance between the
neighbor j and the closest RSU, in order to get the closest, trusted and stable525
path to the RSU, as shown in equation 17.
LinkD(i, k) is the link duration estimation between vehicle i and its neighbor
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|V (i)−V (k)| If V (i) ≥ V (k)
R−Distance(i,j)
|V (i)−V (k)| Else
(18)
In this equation R refers to the communication ratio, and V (i) is the speed
of vehicle i. Algorithm 2 summarizes the data messages forwarding process.530
When a node i receives a data message forwarded by another node, it first
checks whether it was selected as the next forwarder for that message. If so,
it continues the forwarding process. Otherwise, the processing that follows
depends on the application type, thus being outside the scope of this paper.
Afterward, if the data message sender had a higher trust than the predefined535
threshold, the current node tries to reach the RSU if it is within communication
range. Otherwise, it selects the next forwarder and then it forwards again the
data message. Obviously, the message will be dropped if i considers j to be
untrusted.
Algorithm 2 Data messages multi-hop dissemination.
1: Upon receiving a data message from j by i;
2: if (i is the next forwarder) then
3: if (GT (i, j) ≥ TrustThreshold) then
4: if ∃ RSU ∈ neighbors of i then
5: Forward(msg) to RSU;
6: else









Figure 6: Simulated scenario of Laghouat city, Algeria.
6. Performance evaluation540
To evaluate our RITA architecture we relied on the NS-2 simulator [35]
modified to consider the IEEE 802.11p standard. The generated vehicular traffic
is based on the Citymob mobility model [36], which uses SUMO [37] to create
mobility traces based on real maps extracted from OpenStreetMap using the
Krauss Mobility model [38]. In our case we used a map from the downtown545
area of Laghouat, Algeria (see figure 6).
Table 1 summarizes the main simulation parameters:
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Table 1: Simulation parameters.
Parameters Value
Simulation area (km×km) 2×2
Simulation time (s) 300
Transmission range (m) 300
Permissible lane speed (km/h) [0,80]
Number of vehicles {100, 200, 300, 400}





We divide our experiments into three parts: first, we address the optimal
selection of our time window and its time slots, as well as the trade-off between
trust and risk information. Second, we compare the performance of our proposal550
against two other existing proposals - T-CLAIDS [14] and the AECFV [15]
- in different scenarios. While the AECFV proposal is dealing mainly with
blackholes, the authors of T-CLAIDS did not detail their adversarial model, only
assuming the attacker to have a stable continuous malicious behaviour. Finally,
in the third part we discuss our proposed messages dissemination technique555
effectiveness taking end-to-end delay and packet loss ratio as the target metrics.
In our scenario, we assume that beacons are exchanged every half a second,
while an event (i.e. safety message) occurs every 10 seconds.
6.1. Determining the optimal parameter settings
In this section we will determine the optimal values for the α factor repre-560
senting the trade-off between the inter-vehicular trust and the risk estimation,
allowing to defend against both standard and intelligent attacks. In addition,
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Figure 7: Required number of interaction for an efficient trust establishment.
we discuss the choices for the W and P which refers respectively to the window
size and the slots duration parameters. Initially, we assume that factor α = 0.6,
and that 25% of the vehicles within the network are dishonest and behave as565
blackholes.
Figure 7 represents the dishonest nodes detection ration with respect to
the number of interactions (safety and data messages + the recommendations
piggybacked to the received beacons), we note that the detection ratio increases
until we reach approximately 100 interactions when it then offers almost a stable570
values. Therefore, our solution can converge to its optimal detection ratios after
approximately 100 interactions.
In addition, while varying the number of vehicles within the network, figure 8
shows that the average number of direct neighbors is also an important factor
in the detection process, and that it is logically related to the amount of inter-575
vehicle interactions shown in figure 7. Furthermore, figure 8 also shows that
the average number of direct neighbors should not be below 2, otherwise, our
proposal would not perform as good as expected.
As result, the size of W and P can be selected dynamically based of the num-
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Figure 8: Required number of neighbors for an efficient trust establishment.
ber of interactions if we assume that all vehicles can chose different standards,580
with different beaconing frequency, or based on a combined value (number of
direct neighbors, synchronization delay). Hence, we will have an interactions-
based or a neighbors-based selection of values for W and P .
Moreover, many other factors can be taken into account such as: vehicle
density, the simulated map (urban or freeway), as well as the communication585
range. Thus, artificial intelligence solutions such as neural networks can be used
to estimate the best values of W and P dynamically.
For the experiments that follow, we pick the best settings, resulting in W =
100s and P = 20s. These values are achieved for a beacon frequency equal to 2
Hz (i.e, 2 beacons per second), and considering that a data message is sent by590
every vehicle each 10s.
As discussed is section 4, factor α represents the trade-off between the inter-
vehicular trust and the risk estimation, and so it can take different values to
achieve different trade-offs. Figure 9 represents the detection ratios while vary-
ing α parameter. The resulting histograms for different values of α refers to the595
detection performances of RITA againt the intelligent attack, the bad mouting
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Figure 9: α factor selection.
attack, and the blackholes attack. It becomes clear from the histograms that
the best trade-off in terms of detection of the three suggested attacks - betrayal,
bad mouthing and blackholes - is achieved for α = 0.6.
Furthermore, our system alternates between α = 0.6 (combined trust and600
risk) if one of the risk estimation parameters is higher than a predefined thresh-
old TH and α = 1 (trust without risk) if there is no behaviour changing by an
intelligent attacker (the risk estimation parameters are lower than a predefined
threshold TH) as described in equation 19:
α =
 0.6 If (DTV Or ER Or RC) ≥ TH1 Otherwise (19)
Same as TrustThreshold of equation 12, the TH threshold can be chosen605
according to the system security requirements. Hence, for both event related
(ER) and direct trust variation (DTV ), this threshold should be low (e.g, 0.3)
since it is refers to a safety critical case or a detection skip tentative. Higher
values of TH can be acceptable for the case of false recommendations (RC)
since we give more importance to the direct trust evaluation than the indirect610
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Figure 10: RITA detection performance for different vehicular densities in the presence of
intelligent attackers.
one.
6.2. RITA attackers detection performance
In this section we show RITA’s dishonest vehicles detection performances
in the case of intelligent attackers that behave according to figure 1. Afterward,
under a continuous dishonest behaviour, we compare our RITA proposal against615
two existing proposals: T-CLAIDS and AECFV.
Figure 10 represents the detection ratios of RITA with respect to the number
of nodes. It shows that, when varying the number of vehicles in the network,
our proposal can offer good detection ratios mostly exceeding the 90%. In fact,
even for extremely high ratios of attackers (45%), the detection ratio remains620
above 82%. The performance levels for more realistic attacker ratios (≤ 15%)
are nearly 100%, despite all of them perform intelligent attacks thanks to the
risk estimation that allows to RITA detecting such behaviour.
In addition, we compared our solution against other proposals such as AECFV
and T-CLAIDS. As discussed in sections 1 and 2, it should be noted that the625
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Figure 11: Detection performances compared to AECFV and T-CLAIDS for different densities
(35% dishonest vehicles).
latter are only able to detect blackhole attacks, being unable to deal with attack-
ers endowed with trust establishment awareness, and able to launch intelligent
attacks, which raises the detection complexity. Thus, we have simplified the ad-
versarial model to blackhole attacks alone, meaning that attackers will merely
send negative recommendations about its direct neighbors. Figure 11 repre-630
sents the detection ratios for different densities of vehicles. It shows that our
proposal clearly outperforms T-CLAIDS and AECFV by more than 4% for a
density higher that 300 vehicles. Here, since non of the risk estimation param-
eter have a high value exceeding the threshold TH discussed in the previous
section, the α parameter is equal to 1. Hence, the risk estimation margin of635
error is avoided.
Figure 12 represents the detection ratios for different attacker ratios when
the number of vehicles is set to 400. Similarly to figure 11, figure 12 shows
that, when varying the ratio of dishonest vehicles in the scenario, RITA is able
to perform better than both AECFV and T-CLAIDS, ensuring high detection640
ratios (>90%) even if almost half (45%) of the vehicles are dishonest.
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Figure 12: Detection performances compared to AECFV and T-CLAIDS for different dishon-
est vehicles ratios (400 vehicles scenario).
6.3. RITA messages delivery performance
We now study the effectiveness of the proposed dissemination technique in
the presence of dishonest vehicles in the network. Since the message delivery
process attempts to reach an RSU in the shortest possible time, we also assess645
the impact of varying the RSUs density among: (a) 3 RSUs, (b) 6 RSUs, (c) 9
RSUs, and (d) 12 RSUs as illustrated in figure 13.
Figure 14 represents the average end-to-end delay required for packets to
reach an RSU when varying the number of vehicles and RSUs in the network.
The resulting histogram shows that, except for the case of low vehicle and RSU650
densities (less than 200 vehicles and less than 6 RSUs), our proposed technique is
able to provide low delays to the message delivery process (≤ 1 second) despite
the high attackers ratio (35%). For lower attacker ratios, results are even better.
Concerning the packet loss ratio, figure 15 shows that -similarly to the aver-
age end-to-end delay- and thanks to the best forwarder/broadcaster selection,655
our solution can overcome the high ratio of attackers (35%) and ensure low




Figure 13: RSUs distribution in the simulated scenario of Laghouat city, Algeria.
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Figure 14: Average end-to-end delay required to reach an RSU for different vehicle and RSU
densities (35% of dishonest vehicles).
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Figure 15: Packets loss ratio for different vehicle and RSU densities (35% of dishonest vehicles).
cles higher than 200) and the presence of a significant number of RSUs (6 or
more), and can reach quasi optimal values (less than 3%) for a dense network
of both vehicles and RSUs (respectively more than 300 vehicle and 12 RSU).660
7. Conclusions and future work
Introducing security enhancements in collaborative networks is always a hard
and challenging task. In addition, highly dynamic environments like VANETs
make the problem even more complex. The assumption that all nodes are hon-
est and collaborative can lead to catastrophic damages, especially in the scope665
of safety applications. With these challenges in mind, in this work we presented
a trust-based risk-aware technique able to sustain collaborative inter-vehicular
communications even in the presence of high ratios of intelligent attackers within
the network. Our proposal, called RITA, can set dishonest vehicles aside from
all network operations in a completely distributed manner, which makes it inde-670
pendent from the environment and applicable both in the presence and absence
of RSUs.
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Simulation results have shown RITA’s ability to ensure high detection ratios
exceeding the 90% even for a high presence ratios of attackers (45%), as well
as short end-to-end delays (< 0.5s) and reduced packet loss ratios (< 3%) for a675
scenario of more than 300 vehicles and 9 RSUs.
As future work, we plan to study some other types of adversaries adopting
pseudonym-changing techniques for malicious purposes. We also plan to take
advantage of the possible deployment of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to
enhance the inter-vehicular trust accuracy.680
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